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Introduction 
Having failed to prevent the partition of the British India into India 
and Pakistan in 1947, the Indian nationalist elite, who took over 
political power from the British, aspired to build up a strong and 
united nation-state in India.  As a part of its nation-building effort, 
the post-colonial Indian state sought to integrate even the 
backward tribal communities living in the so-called ‘excluded’ and 
‘partially excluded’ areas of British India into the Indian Union.1   
Through a carrot and stick policy, the Indian state tried to ensure 
that majority of indigenous ethnic communities living in the 
Northeast join the Indian federation. The Nagas, considered by the 
colonial rulers as backward tribes, however resisted the 
assimilative policies of the Indian state. By invoking the right to 
self-determination on the basis of their `distinct’ ethnic identity and 
`unique’ history, the Nagas defied the Indian state that sought to 
make them a constituent part of the post-colonial Indian Union.  
Although they resorted to peaceful forms of protest initially, with 
the increase in state repression, the Nagas gradually took to arms 
to fight for independence from the Indian Union.  
In the initial years the Indian political leaders expected that 
the Naga revolt would be easily suppressed by the Indian armed 
forces and that the Nagas, like other ethnic communities in the 
Northeast, would accept India's sovereignty in course of time. But 
contrary to expectations, the Naga struggle raged for more than 
four decades, gradually miring the entire region in insurgency and 
wars of identity. Realizing the limitations of their counter-
insurgency strategy in the Naga Hills, the Indian government 
effected a major policy-shift towards the Naga insurgency in 1990s 
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and made several attempts to negotiate peace with the insurgent 
groups. It concluded cease-fire agreements with Isak-Muivah (IM) 
faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in the 
year 1997 and later negotiated a similar cease-fire agreement with 
Khaplang faction of NSCN in 2001. At the time of writing this 
paper, negotiations were taking place between the government of 
India and the NSCN (IM) leadership to seek a mutually acceptable 
solution to the decades-old Naga problem. At the background of 
the negotiations, however, there simmers a lurking fear that the 
talks may end up in a deadlock like they did before. Among others, 
the continuation of inter-tribal and inter-group rivalries among the 
Nagas and the hostile attitude of neighboring ethnic communities 
and state governments in the region to the extension of Naga cease-
fire agreement to areas beyond Nagaland do pose challenges to the 
peaceful resolution of the Naga problem. However, because of 
major changes in some of the parameters that had adversely 
affected the earlier peace efforts, the prospects of a pragmatic and 
productive negotiation between the Indian government and the 
Naga leaders appear to be brighter at the moment than anytime 
before. The present paper examines the causes for the failure of 
earlier initiatives and explores the possible solutions for resolving 
the contentious issues that still stand in the way of a peaceful 
settlement of the long-running ‘India-Naga’ problem.   
 
History of Naga Resistance Movement    
The name `Naga’ is a generic term that refers to a group of over 
thirty tribes inhabiting not only Nagaland but also some hilly 
regions of the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh in 
Northeast India.  Some of the Naga tribes are also found in the 
Northwestern parts of Myanmar bordering India. The Naga tribes 
are reported to have migrated to these places from further east a 
few thousand years ago. The Naga settlements in the region are 
mentioned in the Royal Chronicles of Manipur and also in the Ahom 
Buranjees2. Despite racial and cultural similarities, each Naga tribe 
has its own language and traditional social and political 
institutions. Till the arrival of the British, most of these 
communities depended on hunting, food gathering and shifting 
cultivation for their livelihood. Except among a few of 
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comparatively advanced Naga tribes such as the Angami, Sema 
and Tangkhul3, which practised wet rice cultivation, the institution 
of private property was not developed among the Nagas before the 
arrival of the British. Nor did they have any central political 
authority like state in the modern sense of the term. Inter-tribal and 
inter-village conflicts were very common. The practice of head-
hunting was quite common among some of these tribes.4  
For long the British did not evince any interest in extending 
their authority over the Naga inhabited hill areas of the Northeast.  
They were primarily interested in developing tea plantations in the 
plains and in the foothills.  British officers encountered the hostile 
Angami Nagas for the first time in 1832, when they were 
undertaking exploratory tours to build road communication 
between Assam and Manipur through the Naga Hills.5 The 
development of tea plantations in the region brought them in 
direct conflict with the Naga tribes. The Nagas, who began to see 
the growing British interests in the region as encroachment, started 
raiding and plundering the villages in the plains. They also 
kidnapped and killed labourers and officers working in the tea 
plantations. It was primarily to discipline the Nagas and to protect 
the British colonial subjects and business interests in the plains 
from the frequent attacks of the marauding Naga tribes that the 
British forces were compelled to take action against the Nagas.6 In 
some areas the British consciously encouraged the settlement of the 
Kuki tribes adjacent to the villages inhabited by the British subjects 
and pitted them against the Naga tribes. The British also used the 
King of Manipur and the chief of North Cachar Hills to contain the 
Nagas.  Later as they began to realize that unregulated entry and 
activities of the White and non-tribal Indian settlers in the region 
would unnecessarily invite confrontations with the savage tribes, 
the British introduced Inner Line regulations in the Naga and 
Lushai Hills.7 Apart from these measures, the British also 
undertook several punitive expeditions against the Nagas.  By the 
end of nineteenth century they could subjugate the Naga resistance 
and establish authority over them. Later the British set up district 
level administration in the Naga Hills. Keen to avoid direct 
interference, the British empowered the village headmen to act on 
behalf of the British Crown. They even constituted the Naga Hills 
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District Tribal Council to guide the administration of the civil 
affairs of the Nagas in accordance with Naga traditions.  However, 
the British left the frontier areas inhabited by the Nagas such as 
Tuensang division and Tirap frontier tract almost un-administered, 
as they viewed establishment of full-fledged administration in 
these areas economically unviable and financially burdensome. 
They also felt that the un-administered areas would act as a buffer 
between British India and China.   
The British government did very little to bring about a 
change in the social and economic conditions of the Nagas. 
However, the Christian missionaries, who were allowed to 
propagate Christianity among the hill tribes, established hospitals 
and schools in the Naga inhabited areas. The spread of Christianity 
and establishment of modern political, administrative and 
educational institutions led to the birth of an educated middle class 
among the Nagas. From the very first quarter of the twentieth 
century this newly emerging class, which had no roots in the 
landed aristocracy and no links with capitalist enterprise8, made 
attempts to rise above tribal loyalties and think in terms of the 
collective interests of all the Nagas. The First World War in which 
some Nagas were recruited as labour corps to assist the British 
forces in different countries also helped the Nagas to be exposed to 
the modern ideas of nation and nationalism. In 1918 these Nagas, 
with the assistance of the British officials, formed the Naga Club to 
work for promoting the interests of the Nagas. When the British 
government appointed the Simon Commission to ascertain the 
views of different sections of Indians about the future form of self-
government, the Naga Club submitted a memorandum to the 
Simon Commission in 1929, asking the British to exclude the Nagas 
from the political processes taking shape in the Indian 
subcontinent.9 Responding positively to the wishes of the Naga 
Club, the Government of India Act of 1935 designated the Naga 
Hills district as an “excluded area” where laws applicable to the 
rest of British-controlled India would not operate and the Nagas 
could continue with their own traditional ways of life with little 
interference from the federal or the provincial government. 
It is interesting to note that the Nagas, who fought fiercely 
against the British in the nineteenth century, gradually began to 
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accept the paternalistic rule of the British and saw the White men 
as their benefactors. However when the British decided to grant 
independence to India, the Nagas found it difficult to accept that 
they would be part of the sovereign Indian State. Their leaders 
argued that since the Nagas were historically, racially and 
culturally different from Indians and were never occupied by the 
Indian rulers, they should be granted freedom as a sovereign 
country when the British would finally leave India.10 The Naga 
Tribal Council, which renamed itself as Naga National Council 
(NNC) in the year 1946 appealed to the British authorities and the 
Indian leaders to grant them independence. They discarded the 
arguments of British officials and Indian leaders who felt that 
being a small and underdeveloped community, it was better for 
them to be a part of independent India and negotiate autonomy 
within the Indian Union. After considerable persuasion and talks, 
NNC leaders like Aliba Imti and T. Sakhrie signed in June 1947 a 
Nine-Point Agreement with Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of 
Assam, wherein it was agreed that ten years after the agreement 
“the Nagas will be free to decide their future”.11  
In subsequent years this clause became a subject of 
controversy among the Nagas and also between the Naga leaders 
and the succeeding Indian governments. The militant leader Zapo 
Phizo interpreted the clause to mean that the Nagas had the right 
to become politically independent after ten years.  The NNC 
delegation met Mahatma Gandhi in July 1947 and even received an 
assurance that he would stop the Indian government from forcibly 
integrating the Nagas into the Indian Union. Enraged by the Indian 
government’s disregard for the Nine-Point Agreement, NNC 
declared independence on August 14, 1947 and intimated the same 
to the Government of India and to the United Nations 
Organization. The Indian state, which became independent and 
sovereign the next day, showed little regard for the aspirations of 
the Naga leaders and went ahead with the drafting of the 
Constitution of India disregarding the Nine-Point Agreement. The 
Constituent Assembly constituted a separate committee under the 
chairmanship of Gopinath Bordoloi, the first chief minister of 
Assam, for suggesting ways and means to accommodate the 
interests and aspirations of the hill tribes of the region within the 
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parameters of Indian Constitution. The NNC refused to send its 
representative to the constitutional sub-committee. The Naga 
leaders rejected the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, 
which disregarded the earlier agreement and made provisions for 
Autonomous District Councils for the hill tribes within the state of 
Assam. The NNC conducted a plebiscite in the Naga Hills district 
in 1951.  Declaring that about 99 per cent of the Nagas voted for 
independence, NNC appealed to India to respect the people’s 
verdict and grant independence to the Nagas. They declined to 
participate in the Assembly and the Parliamentary Elections held 
in 1952.  
Viewing the Naga resistance as basically a law and order 
problem created by individuals like Phizo, the Assam government 
raided the houses of the Naga leaders and banned the Naga 
newspapers. To escape harassment by the armed forces, several 
Naga leaders went underground. The militant leaders, through 
their rigorous propaganda work, spread anti-Indian feelings 
among the Nagas and inspired them to start civil disobedience 
movement against the Indian government in 1952.  With the spread 
of Naga unrest in Tuensang division12 of North East Frontier 
Agency (NEFA) and the subsequent deployment of the Assam 
Rifles13, the Naga resistance movement took violent 
insurrectionary means to achieve its goals.  
After the murder of T. Sakhrie, the moderate Naga leader, 
in January 1956, NNC came increasingly under the control of 
militant leaders like Phizo. The Naga militants formed the Federal 
Government of Nagaland (FGN) in 1956 and initiated armed 
insurrection to carry ahead their struggle for independence.  
Within a few years the Naga movement, which was initially strong 
only in the Naga Hills district, spread to Tuensang Frontier 
Division and to the Naga inhabited areas in Manipur. To contain 
the growing militant activities, the Indian government deployed 
the army and enacted several ‘black’ laws such as the Assam 
Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act 1953, the 
Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955, Armed Forces (Assam, Manipur) 
Special Powers Act 1958 etc., equipping the armed forces with 
more and more powers to deal with insurgents. Taking advantage 
of the special powers assigned to them, the armed forces resorted 
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to blatant violation of human rights, by committing acts of rape, 
murder, arson, loot and forced labor.14  
Despite the odds against it, the NNC chose to continue its 
struggle.  The formation of Nagaland in 1963 as a separate state 
within the Indian Union under the Ministry of External Affairs 
could not satisfy the militants’ urge for freedom. Later in 1964 
responding to the appeals of Naga Peace Mission, NNC agreed to a 
cease-fire agreement with the government of India and engaged in 
negotiations with Indian state for about 18 months.  However, the 
peace talks failed to achieve any break-through because the 
Government of India insisted on solutions within the framework of 
the Indian Constitution and the NNC was not prepared to accept 
anything less than independence. The breakdown of talks led to 
the resignation and replacement of the FGN leadership. With the 
murder of Kaito Sema, the former defense minister of FGN, the 
Sema leaders like Khukhato Sukhai and Scata Swu broke away 
from the NNC and formed the Revolutionary Government of 
Nagaland in 1966.  Later they negotiated with the government of 
India and gave up the struggle.15  
The Naga militants utilized India’s enmity with Pakistan 
and China to seek moral and material support from them for 
continuing their struggle against the Indian state. However, the 
victory of India over Pakistan in 1971 and the subsequent creation 
of Bangladesh partially weakened the external support base of 
NNC, which had already become weak due to internal dissensions. 
Taking advantage of their weakness, in 1972 the Indian 
government banned NNC, FGN and other militant organizations. 
Contrary to the spirit of the Sixteen Point Agreement, the state of 
Nagaland was transferred from the Ministry of External Affairs to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs. The government of India imposed 
President’s Rule in Nagaland in 1975 and went ahead with ruthless 
army operations. The imposition of National Emergency and 
further concentration of executive powers in the hands of the then 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave further teeth to counter 
insurgency operations. During this critical period, a section of the 
NNC leaders came out and signed the Shillong Accord in 
November 1975. The Accord stated that the underground militants 
“on their volition, accept, without condition, the Constitution of 
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India” and that they even agreed to surrender arms in order to 
prepare the ground for future talks with the Indian government.  
The signatories of the accord were alleged to be close to Phizo.16  
Although Phizo was aware of the contents of the Shillong Accord, 
he neither openly endorsed it, nor unreservedly condemned it.  
The content of the Accord and the silence of Phizo irritated certain 
radical elements within NNC. Leaders like Isaac Swu and Th. 
Muivah openly denounced the Shillong Accord and the Phizo 
leadership and braving all threats from the supporters of the 
accord within NNC, they decided to carry ahead the militant 
movement for independence. By aligning with Khaplang, the 
leader of Konyak Nagas, the two radical leaders formed the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. By 
initiating several radical and populist programmes/reforms in the 
fields of economy, culture and politics, very soon NSCN emerged 
as a powerful and popular Naga militant organization. However, 
NSCN suffered a jolt in 1988 with the split of the organization into 
two factions – one led by Swu and Th. Muivah and the other by 
Khaplang.17 Due to ideological and personality clashes, NNC also 
had split into factions.  
At present there are four Naga militant groups – NNC 
(Adino), NNC (Panger), NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) – who claim to 
be representing the Naga cause. Of the four, undoubtedly the 
NSCN (IM) group enjoys maximum strength and hold over the 
Nagas. By strengthening its organizing and military capabilities, by 
building alliances with other insurgent groups in the Northeast 
and by internationalizing the Naga problem through forums such 
as the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO) 
and other international forums of the indigenous peoples, NSCN 
(IM) has become so powerful that no solution to the Naga problem 
can be conceived of without engaging this outfit. 
           
Experience of Earlier Accords and Peace Negotiations  
Apart from the use of force as a means, the Indian leaders starting 
from Jawaharlal Nehru made intermittent efforts to bring the 
agitating Nagas to the negotiating table by trying to win over the 
moderate elements among the Nagas. In late 1950s, when the Naga 
Peoples’ Convention (NPC), defying the NNC’s diktat, came 
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forward with a 16 point proposal, the Indian government under the 
prime ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru entered into an agreement 
with the NPC in 1960. The agreement proposed the idea of making 
Naga Hills Tuensang Area into a separate state of Nagaland within 
the Indian Union. According to the agreement no Act or law passed 
by the Union Parliament affecting the Naga religious or social 
practices, their customary laws and procedures, civil and criminal 
justice and ownership and transfer of land and resources, shall have 
any legal force in Nagaland unless accepted by a majority vote of 
the Nagaland Legislative Assembly. The Indian government 
accepted NPC’s proposals concerning local self-government, 
administration of justice and continuation of the Inner Line 
Regulation rules. The Indian government also accepted the proposal 
to place Nagaland under the Ministry of External Affairs of the 
government of India. However, no commitment was given with 
regard to the proposal for inclusion of the contiguous areas 
inhabited by the Nagas as a part of the state of Nagaland.18  
Accordingly, the government of India passed a bill in the parliament 
and made necessary changes in the Indian Constitution to facilitate 
the birth of Nagaland as a separate state in 1963. Although the 
moderates were satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations and 
participated in the Assembly and Parliamentary elections held in 
1960s, the NNC militants denounced the agreement as a 
compromise. Their decision to continue the struggle for 
independence eluded prospects for peace. 
The second initiative to restore peace and facilitate talks 
between the Naga militants and the government of India was taken 
by the Nagaland Peace Mission, which came into existence due to 
the efforts of the Nagaland Baptist Church Council.  In 1964 the 
government of India and the Federal Government of Nagaland 
signed a ceasefire agreement to facilitate peace talks. The Peace 
Mission, which included eminent persons like Jaya Prakash 
Narayan, Bimala Prasad Chaliha and Rev. Michael Scott, placed its 
proposals before the two parties for pursuance of lasting peace.  
The Mission suggested, among others, that the Nagas on their own 
volition would decide to participate in the Union of India and 
mutually settle terms and conditions for that purpose. On the other 
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hand, the government of India would consider recasting and 
adopting a new pattern and structure of relationship with 
Nagaland, which will satisfy the political aspirations of all sections 
of Nagas.19  Elaborating the idea of volition mentioned in the peace 
proposals, Jaya Prakash Narayan clarified: “We are not asking that 
this voluntary participation in the Indian Union should be 
unconditional. This voluntary participation would follow 
agreement on the pattern of the future relationship between 
Nagaland and the Government of India.”20  
Even Rev. Michael Scott, who was considered a supporter 
of Naga militants, expressed the view that Nagas enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in the fields that affect them the most.  He 
said: “If Nagaland, in its present stage of development, has no 
economic resources enabling it to be independent in the real sense 
of the word, Naga leaders would be honest and realistic if they face 
these facts of life and pursue a policy which will bring peace to the 
people and will also give a reasonable prospect of achieving 
progress and growth.”21 He was also forthright in suggesting that 
the Naga leaders required a clear conception and precise picture of 
what is meant by independence and sovereignty. At the same time, 
he pointed out to the Indian government that there was no 
substance in insisting on solution within the framework of Indian 
Constitution, for there is nothing sacrosanct about the Indian 
Constitution. What needs to be insisted on is solution within the 
Indian Union, and not necessarily within the Indian Constitution. 
Suggesting different forms of relationship that India and Nagas 
could think of, he made a mention of a form of relationship for 
which no precedent existed in the world. That involved entering 
into an accord with the Naga people, giving them sovereign status 
and at the same time retaining them within the confederation or 
within the Indian Union.22  
Despite sincere efforts made by the Peace Mission members 
to come out with the fairest and most practical solutions possible at 
that time, the peace talks between the government of India and the 
Naga militants ended in a deadlock, primarily because of the 
continued misapprehension among the parties and their reluctance 
to think and act above their stated positions.   
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Apart from the Peace Mission members, another effort to 
mediate between Indian government and the Nagas was made by 
one Rungsung Suisa, a moderate Tangkhul Naga leader, popularly 
known as ‘Uncle Suisa’. In the mid-1960s, after consulting Indira 
Gandhi and other leaders of the Congress Party, he came out with 
an idea of link relationship between India and Nagaland, wherein 
the parties could reach some kind of federal agreement with regard 
to administration of certain subjects like defense, foreign relations, 
communications etc. and leave to Nagaland all other subjects of 
immediate significance. He suggested that Nagaland would not 
take any steps inimical to the interests of India and that India 
should assist Nagaland in becoming self-sufficient. He sent his 
proposals to the leaders of Indian government as well as to the 
Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN). The militant leaders of 
NNC and FGN, who were not prepared to accept anything less 
than full independence, paid no heed to his pragmatic suggestion. 
In 1988 when Indian an emissary came to NSCN leaders with a 
proposal along Suisa’s line, Khaplang split the NSCN by alleging 
that Th. Muivah and Isak Swu had virtually accepted the Suisa 
proposal and were ready to trade Naga interests with India. 
Muivah and Swu openly denounced Khaplang’s allegations and 
swore by their commitment to continue the struggle for Naga 
independence. It took almost two decades for the NSCN (IM) 
leadership to accept that there was some substance in Suisa’s 
proposals.23     
 The failure of such peace initiatives made by the third 
parties resulted in the breakdown of the ceasefire and renewal of 
both insurgency and counter insurgency operations. India’s 
success in Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the birth of Bangladesh, 
imposition of President’s rule in Nagaland and gradual 
concentration of all powers in the hands of Indira Gandhi, 
especially after the declaration of the Emergency in 1975, created 
such a suffocating situation for the Nagas that in the mid-1970s a 
few underground Naga leaders came out to negotiate with the 
government of India and concluded an accord, popularly known as 
the Shillong Accord, in the year 1975.  The accord stated that the 
representatives of the underground organizations conveyed their 
decision, of their own volition, to accept, without condition, the 
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Constitution of India.  It was agreed that the Naga militants would 
hand over their arms and formulate issues for final settlement with 
the Indian government.   
It was obvious that the accord was made under duress. 
Although the underground leaders who signed the accord were in 
touch with Phizo, the accord as such was not signed officially by 
NNC or FGN. As explained earlier, the accord intensified the 
ideological and leadership struggles and led to the formation of 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). The Shillong 
Accord came in for such sharp criticism that the very soon NNC 
was forced to disassociate itself from the members who signed the 
accord. The exercise did not pay any dividends to the Indian 
government. After the accord the NNC was considerably 
weakened, but the insurgency continued in a more organized and 
militant manner under the NSCN leadership.  With the change of 
leadership from Angamis to Tanghkhuls and Konyaks, the Naga 
resistance, which was confined earlier basically to Nagaland and 
the hills of Manipur spread to parts of Assam and Arunachal 
Pradesh. Thus in a bitter way the Indian state realized that peace 
could not be imposed by entering into an accord with a section of 
the militants through the bullying tactics. No accord with 
individuals claiming to be representing the Nagas can ensure 
peace, so long as the Naga community as a whole does not 
perceive it as equal, just and honourable. It took nearly two 
decades for the Indian government to undo its mistake and bring 
the Naga militants again to the negotiating table. 
 
Changing International and Regional Scenarios 
Recent structural changes in regional and international scenarios 
have, in recent years, compelled both the Indian government and 
the Naga militants to reconsider their positions regarding the Naga 
problem. World events like the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
disappearance of the socialist bloc, emergence of a unipolar world, 
strengthening of market forces etc. have forced India to revise its 
security and developmental strategies. At home, the foreign 
exchange crisis of the early 1990s, the growing strength of the 
Indian monopolies and the need to explore new markets to 
compensate for the loss of secure markets of the socialist camp 
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have compelled the Indian policy makers to give up the façade of 
socialism/mixed economy and embrace the policy of liberalization 
and globalization. Realizing the limitations of passive dependence 
on the Western powers, India has begun to look towards East Asia 
for economic growth and opportunities. India’s need to strengthen 
ties with China, Japan and the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries has in turn given birth to the Look East 
Policy in recent years. With time, the Indian policy makers have 
come to realize the strategic, economic and cultural importance of 
the Northeast Indian states for the success of its Look East strategy. 
It has come to appreciate that the historical, geographical, racial 
and cultural links that this region has with China and ASEAN 
countries can well be assets to India. This realization has compelled 
the Indian establishment to reconsider its policy towards the 
northeast.24  
Thus, economic considerations have forced India to revise 
its decades-old policy of looking at Northeast India from a mere 
defense perspective. Since 1990s concrete steps have been initiated 
to strengthen transport, communications and other infrastructure 
in the region in order to facilitate greater economic and 
psychological integration of the region and its people into the so-
called `Indian mainstream’. The policy makers have also 
recognized the need for effective governance for the success of 
developmental and welfare policies in the region.  The efforts and 
intentions of the leaders in the Indian capital New Delhi, however, 
cannot be realized as long as peace eludes this region.  Restoring 
peace in the region, therefore, is very vital for the success of India’s 
Look East policy.25 India has learnt from its experience in the 
region that insurgency is a political problem, and not a law and 
order problem. This realization has compelled Indian leaders to 
explore all possibilities of negotiating peace with the insurgent 
groups active in the region. The NSCN (IM) being the most 
organized and powerful insurgent group in the region it is but 
natural that India gives priority to settlement with the NSCN (IM) 
leadership.      
The Naga militants too have their compulsions to look for a 
solution to the Naga problem through peaceful and political 
methods. Howsoever heroic may be their struggle, they have 
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realized that they would never be able to pursue the goal of 
achieving a sovereign Nagaland or Nagalim through violent 
means. There is a growing feeling among the Naga people that 
both insurgency and counter insurgency have violated their rights, 
left them divided along factional and tribal lines, and kept the 
region underdeveloped and backward. Moreover, for better or 
worse, the five decades of forced as well as voluntary association 
with the Indian economy and politics has created a section among 
them who feel that integration at some level with India is 
inevitable and advantageous to the Nagas.26 The aversion and 
suspicion that the Nagas as a whole had against India and the 
Indians in 1950s have declined over the years, partly because of the 
impact of Indian education, mass media and films.  Decades back, 
other than the NNC, only church and chiefs exercised influence on 
the Naga public opinion.  But over the years, several other civil 
society organizations such as the Naga Hoho, Naga Mothers’ 
Association (NMA), Naga Students’ Federation (NSF), Naga 
People’s Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), the United 
Committee of Manipur (UCM), All Naga Students’ Association of 
Manipur (ANSAM) etc., have come to play significant roles in the 
Naga civil society. There is no truth in the allegation that all of 
them are mere frontal organizations of the Naga militants as they 
enjoy certain amounts of autonomy and there are instances when 
they did take stands against violence perpetrated by the militants 
themselves. In recent years, the Naga Baptist Church, Naga 
Mothers’ Association and the Naga Hoho have consistently made 
efforts to bring an end to inter-tribal and factional quarrels and to 
build up an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation.27 No Naga 
insurgent group can now afford to ignore the opinion and 
aspirations of the Naga people as expressed through these civil 
society organizations. The Naga civilians have suffered 
considerably due to counter-insurgency operations and also due to 
inter- and intra-faction conflicts.  The public outrage against the 
militants’ excesses in Mokokchung and Tuensang in 2003 clearly 
indicates the limits of their tolerance.  The Naga militant groups 
cannot but read the writings on the wall and assess their own 
actions, policies and programmes.    
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In addition to these internal considerations, the Naga 
militants are compelled to pay attention to the hard realities of the 
changing world order. The regional developments such as the birth 
of Bangladesh, China’s deviation from the socialist path and the 
growing relations between India and Myanmar have considerably 
weakened the external support base of the insurgent groups.  The 
anti-terrorist policies pursued by the US and its allies since 
September 11, 2001 have also made it almost impossible for the 
‘liberation’ struggles to achieve their objectives through violent 
means. These factors apart, the NSCN (IM)’s leadership has also 
become aware of the practical difficulties that Nagaland will have 
to face in the event of it becoming completely independent of 
India.  The leadership now appears to have realized that some kind 
of dependence on India is inevitable and even necessary for the 
Nagas at this stage of their development.28 Their willingness to 
negotiate with India should be seen in the light of all these internal 
and external compulsions. 
 
Recent Ceasefire and Peace Talks  
The initiative to convince the NSCN (IM)’s leadership of the need 
to seek a political solution to the Naga problem through dialogue 
was taken by P.V. Narasimha Rao, who happened to be the Prime 
Minister of India at a crucial period when India was compelled to 
initiate the policy of liberalization. The Indian government sent 
emissaries to seek communication with the NSCN (IM) leaders. 
Despite the frequent changes in governments at the Centre, the 
efforts to bring the NSCN (IM) to negotiating table continued 
during Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral regimes also.  
The efforts bore fruit with both the Indian government and 
the NSCN (IM) accepting a cease-fire agreement in 1997. Although 
the initial agreement was only for a period of three months, the 
cease-fire was extended periodically to facilitate talks. In 1990s the 
NSCN (IM) leaders met the successive Indian Prime Ministers and 
had discussions with Indian emissaries in Bangkok, Osaka, 
Amsterdam, Zurich, Geneva, Kuala Lumpur and other places.29 In 
2003, during Vajpayee’s term as the Prime Minister for the first 
time, the self-exiled leaders of NSCN (IM) – Isak Swu and Th. 
Muivah – came to India to hold discussions with Indian leadership. 
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Later, when the Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Nagaland, he 
made a public announcement that India recognized the unique 
history of the Nagas and expressed his government’s support to 
the peace process.  
In 2004 after the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) took 
over power at the centre, at the invitation of Man Mohan Singh, the 
present Prime Minister of India, Isak Swu and Th. Muivah visited 
India and had talks with political leaders, ministers and top 
government officials. After several decades, the leaders visited 
Nagaland and held talks with the representatives of the Naga civil 
society. The Naga leaders spent almost six months in India getting 
feed back from their own people and negotiating their demands 
with the government of India. The Indian government treated the 
NSCN (IM) leaders, not as terrorists, but as political 
representatives of the Naga nation. On their part, the Naga leaders 
promised to come as close to India politically as possible and 
expected that India would in turn respect their basic concerns and 
expectations. Despite irritants caused by the violent protests of 
Meiteis in June 2001 against the proposal for extension of cease-fire 
beyond the boundaries of Nagaland, the Naga leaders recognized 
India’s constraints and avoided taking any drastic measures that 
would impede the peace process. This mature understanding and 
mutual appreciation on the part of both the Indian and the Naga 
leadership raise the hope of an amicable and mutually acceptable 
solution to the decades-old Naga issue.            
 
Obstacles in the Path of Peace 
Despite the best intentions of the Indian government and the 
NSCN (IM)’s leadership, one need not expect that the ongoing 
political dialogue would end with an amicable settlement in the 
immediate future. The success of peace talks depends considerably 
on how ably the parties overcome their own limitations and learn 
to appreciate others’ difficulties and compulsions. It is therefore 
necessary to discuss the basic impediments that are likely to derail 
the peace process.  
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Question of Sovereignty  
The Naga militants mobilized the Nagas against the Indian State 
with the avowed objective of establishing a sovereign Naga nation. 
They had such a faith in their ability to build their own 
independent state that they viewed all those individuals –Nagas as 
well as Indians who expressed doubts about the desirability and 
possibility of a sovereign Nagaland - as their enemies or traitors to 
the cause.  Neither the autonomous district councils provided in 
the Indian Constitution nor statehood within the Indian Union 
could satisfy the Naga militants. They rejected Indira Gandhi’s 
offer of a Bhutan type status to Nagaland and paid no attention to 
Suisa’s proposal.30 All the earlier peace initiatives failed to restore 
peace because of the uncompromising stand of the Naga militant 
leaders on the issue of sovereignty.   
The militant leaders’ fixation with the idea of sovereignty 
was not, however, shared by all Nagas.  The NPC, which came out 
with its 16-point programme and negotiated with the Indian state 
for a province of Nagaland within the Indian Union, had support 
of a section of Nagas. Since the formation of Nagaland, many 
Nagas have voluntarily participated in the election process and 
elected their representatives to the state assembly and the Indian 
parliament.  The administrative, political and economic integration 
of the region with India has given birth to moderate pro-Indian 
elite among them, which accepts in principle India’s sovereignty 
over the Nagas. While these moderates may still aspire for greater 
autonomy, they no longer insist on political independence. Even 
within NNC, there were moderates who were against pursuing 
violent means and were ready for some kind of autonomy within 
the Indian Union. But the militants within NNC muzzled the 
moderate voices and at times physically liquidated them by 
branding them as traitors. T. Sakhrie was brutally murdered in 
1956 for opposing the violent means advocated by leaders like 
Phizo. When some underground militants, under pressure from 
the government of India, signed the Shillong Accord in 1975 and 
agreed to abide by the Indian Constitution, the radicals opposed to 
the accord discarded NNC and established NSCN to carry ahead 
the goal of independent Nagaland. The campaign of the NSCN 
subsequently forced even the NNC leaders to disown the Shillong 
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Accord and proclaim that they did not abandon the struggle for 
Naga independence. The fear of compromise on the issue of 
sovereignty was so strong that even NSCN split into two factions 
following a rumour that Th. Muivah was planning to surrender 
NSCN to India. The militants have apparently become prisoners of 
their own self-declared goals that they are now afraid that their 
enemies or their own followers would call foul if they dared to 
reconsider or deviate from the same.   
It now appears that NSCN (IM) has understood the 
practical problems that the Nagas will have to face if they choose to 
break away from India. This is perhaps why, in the parleys with 
the government of India, its leaders are not harping so much on the 
demand for sovereignty. They are promising to be as close to India 
as possible provided India recognizes their right to self-
determination and their unique history.  Of late Th. Muivah was 
talking about some sort of special federal relationship with the 
Indian Union, outside the constitutional framework of India.31  
Although the NSCN (IM) leaders obtained the consent of different 
Naga tribal Hohos for the continuation of peace talks on behalf of 
all the Nagas, whether Muivah and Swu will be able to convince all 
other parties to agree to a compromise on the issue of 
independence is not clear at the moment. Since other militant 
groups such as NNC and NSCN (K) are openly stating that they 
will not accept anything less than independence, it now depends 
on the NSCN (IM) leadership as to how it deals with these 
discontented voices and mobilise public opinion in its favour.    
 
Integration of Naga Inhabited Areas 
The NSCN (IM)’s ability to convince the Nagas of the need to 
compromise on the issue of independence considerably depends 
on its success in making the Indian government accept the popular 
demand of the Nagas for integration of all Naga inhabited areas 
under one administrative unit. Although there are differences 
among the Nagas on the issue of sovereignty, there is a near 
unanimity among all political parties, militant groups and civil 
society organizations of the Nagas on the issue of integration of all 
Naga inhabited areas, including those outside the boundaries of 
the present state of Nagaland.  Several resolutions have been 
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passed in support of this demand in Nagaland State Assembly.  
The United Naga Council, All Naga Students’ Assocation of 
Manipur and other Naga civil organizations in Manipur are also 
insisting on this demand.  The Naga tribes inhabiting Assam and 
Arunachal Pradesh have likewise expressed their solidarity with 
other Nagas living in Northeast India.  However, this demand for 
Greater Nagaland/Nagalim has provoked violent protests by the 
Meiteis in Manipur.  Apart from the Meiteis, the Assamese and the 
Arunachalese have also expressed their opposition to any move 
aimed at altering the borders of their states to accommodate the 
demands of the NSCN (IM).  Succumbing to the popular pressures, 
the state governments in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh 
have declared openly that they would not accept any agreement by 
the government of India that altered their state boundaries.32 In 
such a situation, without seeking some kind of common ground 
among the communities in conflict, one cannot hope for peaceful 
solution to the Naga problem.   
Historically dispersed over the large tract of hill terrain 
starting from Lushai Hills on the south to the China border on the 
north and from Makaw on the east to Mariani on the west, 
different Naga tribes had different kinds of experiences with the 
people living in the plains. While it is true that some of the Naga 
tribes virtually had no contact with the plains, those living in the 
borders with Assam and Manipur did have some kind of 
interaction with the rulers and the people living there. There are 
historical evidences to show that some Naga tribes challenged the 
authority of Ahom and Manipur kings and were forced to pay 
tributes/taxes in kind for sometime to the kings who defeated 
them. Barring such temporary subservience to external powers, the 
Naga tribes remained autonomous and in the pre-colonial times 
the kings in the plains also acknowledged their autonomy and 
rarely interfered in their internal affairs.  
The Nagas at no point of time in history had a unified state 
of their own. Despite racial and cultural similarities, common 
political identity among them as Nagas could not emerge in the 
region till the arrival of the British. As such the notion of common 
Naga identity is a colonial product and had no historical 
antecedents.  It developed first in the British carved Naga Hills 
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district and after India became independent and as the Naga 
national movement became militant, it gradually spread to other 
Naga inhabited areas in the region. Outside Nagaland, the urge to 
be a part of the Greater Nagaland or ‘Nagalim’, as the NSCN 
leaders choose to call it, is very strong in the hill districts of 
Manipur, but is weak in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.  
Compared to the Naga experience, the Manipuri and the 
Assamese identities have different historical bases. Although 
colonialism played a role in their development, these identities had 
their roots in the experiences of the people living under the pre-
colonial states of the Meiteis, Ahoms, Kochs and Dimasas.  Unlike 
ethnic nationalism of the Nagas, the Assamese and the Manipuri 
identities were borne out of the composite civic experiences of 
different ethnic communities subjected to some kind of feudal rule, 
much before these regions came under the British rule.33 Those 
claiming themselves as Assamese or Manipuris did not base their 
claims on common ethnic or racial identities, but on their collective 
historical experiences as subjects living under the pre-colonial 
states. These identities, by their very nature, were multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural. Where identities are based on civic nationalism, one 
can see more than one ethnic group identifying itself with such 
identities. Compared to the Assamese and Manipuri identities, the 
Arunachalee identity is very recent. It emerged slowly after the 
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) was integrated with Indian 
Union and named as a separate state of Arunachal Pradesh. This 
new identity can also be claimed as civic national identity, as it 
does not identify itself with particular tribe(s) and it claims to 
represent all indigenous tribal communities living in Arunchal 
Pradesh.      
In Northeast India one can see the emergence of both civic 
and ethnic nationalisms. In fact the conflicting territorial claims 
between the Nagas and their neighbours – the Manipuris, the 
Assamese and the Arunachalees – can be understood better when 
juxtaposed as ethnic vis-a-vis civic nationalism.34   
It is commendable that NSCN (IM) and the Naga civil 
society organizations have realized the need to convince their 
neighbours of their claims.  However, if such efforts are to bear 
fruits, it is essential that they also listen and understand the logic of 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005. 
 
 
77
others and realize the limits of their own stated positions.  It makes 
little sense to claim control over a territory stating that they are the 
original settlers in the region.  The Nagas should realize that many 
other tribes and non-tribal communities presently inhabit the 
regions over which the Nagas are staking claims. The concerns of 
the non-Naga communities for security and their rights over the 
land where they presently inhabit are of no less significant 
compared to those of the Nagas.  Even in those regions, where 
majority of the residents happen to be Nagas, the sentiments of the 
others, who for historical reasons view those regions as part of 
their composite identity, cannot be wished away. The issue being 
very sensitive, political maturity demands that the Naga leaders 
take great care in handling the emotions of all concerned 
communities. It is necessary to realize that lending direct or 
indirect support to inhuman acts such as the enforcement of road 
blockades on the national highways and obstructing the supplies of 
essential goods to other communities would not create conducive 
environment for peaceful resolution of the problem of Naga 
integration. The integration of all Naga inhabited areas could 
become a reality in future only with the consent of other 
communities and states in the region and never by coercion or 
force.   
 
Question of Unity among the Nagas  
Another stumbling block in the way of peaceful negotiated 
settlement to the Naga problem is the lack of unity among the 
Nagas.35 The history of Naga movement is a witness to several 
fratricidal struggles among the Nagas along village, tribal, and 
ideological lines. At the time of independence there were moderate 
leaders like Aliba Imti and T. Sakhrie, who were negotiating 
basically for greater autonomy within the Indian Union, whereas 
leaders like Phizo gave the clarion call for independence.  
In the late fifties and early sixties, while the militants under 
the leadership of NNC and FGN went ahead with their 
insurrection, the moderates who rallied around NPC entered into a 
16 point agreement with the Indian government. Alongside 
persons like S.C. Jamir, the former Chief Minister of Nagaland, 
who claimed that the agreement was the ‘bed rock of the Naga 
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movement’, there are radicals of NNC and other Naga militant 
groups who denounced the formation of Nagaland in 1963 as a sell 
out. Unlike the militants who did not accept anything less than 
independence, the moderates, while lending support to the 
demands for more autonomy and for integration of Naga inhabited 
areas, opposed the idea of secession from the Indian Union.  
In the late 1960s, as the efforts of the Peace Mission failed, 
NNC showed cracks along tribal lines. Following the forced 
resignation of the Sema leaders from the top positions of NNC and 
FGN and the subsequent killing of Kaito Sema, former Defense 
Minister, the Semas disassociated themselves from NNC and 
announced the formation of Revolutionary Government of 
Nagaland in 1968.  Subsequently their leaders negotiated with the 
Indian government and gave up the insurgent path. Again in the 
mid-1970s, when some NNC leaders, allegedly with the blessings 
of Phizo, negotiated with the Indian government and signed the 
Shillong Accord in their individual capacities, the militants among 
the NNC, led by Th. Muivah and Swu, rejected the Phizo 
leadership and formed NSCN.  This tussle took the form of tribal 
conflict between the Angami and Tangkhul tribes. The rise of 
NSCN led to the decline of the Angami leadership and the rise of 
the Tangkhuls and the Konyaks.  However, the honeymoon 
between the Tangkhuls and the Konyaks came to an end with the 
break up of NSCN into two factions, i.e., NSCN (IM) and NSCN 
(K). Inter-tribal rivalries sometimes influence the communities’ 
approach to basic demands such as integration of all Naga 
inhabited areas.   
Of late it has come to light that some leaders in Nagaland, 
who are not quite comfortable with the Tangkhuls, view the issue 
of integration mainly as the demand of the Tangkhul leaders 
heading the NSCN (IM). The Khaplang faction openly expressed 
its resentment against the Tangkhul-led NSCN (IM) taking the lead 
in peace talks.36 It is a different matter that the leaders of NSCN (K) 
have admitted in a different context that the “Nagas in general 
remained essentially tribal in their social behaviour, attitudes and 
the working style. In their inter-tribal relationships they could not 
totally remove mutual suspicions of the past warring era.  
Anything and everything was still tended to be viewed and 
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approached from the tribal lines.  As such the evolving Naga 
nation remains more or less superficial, thereby making it very 
fragile and brittle”.37  
The leaders of NSCN (IM) tried to bring unity among the 
Naga tribes by raising the slogan ‘Nagalim for Christ’. In recent 
years, the Church leaders in Nagaland are advocating the need for 
reconciliation and peace among the warring Naga communities in 
the name of Christianity. The Atlanta Meet hosted by Baptist Peace 
Fellowship of North America and attended by various Naga 
political and social organizations passed a resolution in August 
1997 appealing the Naga people to “relinquish old antagonisms, 
giving up old grudges. Old memories of injury and insult have 
controlled our relations for too long.” Reminding the Christian 
maxim that “A house divided against itself cannot stand”, the 
appeal urged all Naga leaders in every sector of society, to take 
significant steps to bring reconciliation, building upon the best of 
Naga heritage.38 Since the Atlanta Meet, the Church leaders and the 
Naga Hohos took several initiatives to bring unity among different 
Naga tribes and factions.  
However, Naga unity still remains a mirage because of the 
continuing ideological and personality clashes. The NSCM (IM) 
leaders believe that they are the only nationalist force representing 
the interests of the Nagas.  They consider NNC factions and NSCN 
(K) as anti-national and reactionary forces. Naturally they question, 
“How could there be unity between the dead and the living, 
between darkness and light, between rust and steel, between the 
reactionary traitors and the revolutionary portraits, between 
tribalism and the socialism of the NSCN?  It is simply a pity for one 
to talk of unity between the totally perishing Phizo’s clique and 
vigorously risen forces of the NSCN”.39 The NSCN (IM) believes 
that only the strengthening of the nationalist forces under its own 
leadership could ensure unity among the Nagas.  But this strategy 
of NSCN (IM), which seems to be influenced by Mao’s strategy of 
winning over all the nationalist forces under Kuomintang to the 
side of the Red Army, may not work, as the Naga situation is not 
akin to the one in China. In the complex history of Naga 
movement, it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between the 
nationalist forces and the reactionaries. Although in the course of 
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time NSCN (IM) has emerged as the most powerful militant Naga 
group, it does not still have a hold over all the Naga tribes. 
However diminished might be their present status, the other 
militant groups and factions also enjoy some support among 
certain tribal communities. Apart from the militant groups, there 
are a few moderate political parties and leaders, which have 
support among certain sections within the Naga society.  
As such the heterogeneous character of the Naga civil 
society cannot conceive of just one political entity, i.e., NSCN (IM), 
representing the voices and interests of all sections of the Naga 
society.40 In a situation like this, even though the peace talks could 
start with NSCN (IM), at a later stage it becomes essential for the 
Indian state to engage other Naga groups to ensure that all the 
parties abide by the treaty agreement that the Indian government 
might conclude with the NSCN (IM) leaders. The experience of the 
16 point agreement and the Shillong Accord clearly indicates that 
lasting peace cannot be established by entering into an agreement 
only with one faction or group of Naga leaders. In view of the 
problems that NNC and NSCN (K) factions might create, the 
NSCN (IM)’s leadership needs to adopt a pragmatic strategy to 
ensure that the peace process initiated by it would not be derailed 
by other disgruntled forces. Instead of trying to impose its will on 
the people, it should listen to the Naga public opinion and respond 
positively to the process of reconciliation and unity initiated by the 
Naga civil society organizations.    
 
Limitations of the Indian State 
The Indian state could possibly have resolved the Naga problem, if 
the political elite had correctly apprehended the intensity of the 
Naga sentiments right at the time of independence. Partly its big-
brotherly attitude and partly its strategic considerations drove 
India to hold on to a piece of territory which otherwise had little 
economic significance to India. India had to pay the price for its 
indulgence by spending hundreds of millions of rupees on military 
and paramilitary forces and for taking up the responsibility of 
economic development of the state and welfare of its people. India 
also had to face charges of human rights violations in Nagaland.   
Contrary to expectations of Indian leaders, Naga insurgency has 
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grown in strength and become an inspiration for other ethnic 
insurgencies in Northeast India. From its experiences, India has 
realized that it is impossible to put an end to Naga insurgency only 
through military and monetary interventions. Similarly the practice 
of divide and rule might help to weaken the militant movement for 
a while, but it can never eliminate the roots of insurgency. The 
changed international political and economic scenario also compels 
the Indian state to seek a solution for the decades-long Naga 
problem.  
While hoping for the best, one should however be 
pragmatic enough to acknowledge what the Indian state can and 
cannot do.  In some aspects it finds itself a prisoner of its own acts 
of omission and commission. Having inherited the territory from 
its colonial masters, India cannot easily undo the demographic 
changes that the British colonialism has brought in the region. 
Moreover, the post-colonial developments like establishment of 
liberal political and administrative institutions and practices, 
reorganization of the states, spread of modern education, 
development of monetary economy etc. have given birth to new 
social forces with their own territorial conceptions and interests. 
The competing conceptions of territoriality articulated by these 
new social forces impede to a considerable extent the powers of the 
central government to exercise its constitutional powers to alter the 
boundaries of the existing states. As such the Indian state, even if it 
is in favour of appeasing the NSCN (IM), it cannot agree to cease-
fire in all Naga inhabited areas in the Northeast or redraw the 
boundaries of the states in the region to give shape to Nagalim or 
Greater Nagaland. In attempting to solve Naga problem, the 
Indian state cannot afford to encounter disturbances in other states 
of the region. As such no final decision on the integration of all 
Naga inhabited areas can sensibly be taken without consulting and 
convincing different parties, groups and communities affected by 
it. Similarly, even if India officially recognizes the distinct and 
unique history of the Nagas, it cannot afford to grant full 
independence to the Nagas without inviting hostile reactions in 
other parts of India. If the Nagas are granted independence, there 
will be similar demands from other communities and groups in the 
region, which the Indian state cannot afford to entertain. Of course, 
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India can well give up its insistence on finding a solution within 
the constitutional framework. It can work towards an honourable 
and mutually acceptable treaty agreement with Naga 
representatives. While recognizing the Nagas as a distinct entity 
and granting them internal sovereignty it could still have the 
Nagas as strategic partners within the Indian Union.    
 
Conclusion 
Had Naga militants and the Indian government realized their own 
limitations and appreciated each other’s expectations and 
compulsions, the Naga problem would have found a solution long 
back. Mutual suspicion, inflexible mind-sets and preconceived 
notions let down the peace initiatives of 1960s. If the parties in 
conflict expect the present phase of peace talks to succeed, they 
need to take lessons from the mistakes/limitations of the past. An 
atmosphere of trust and confidence must be created for a 
meaningful dialogue.  
It is also required of the Naga representatives to be realistic 
about their demands.  While one is free to put forward any number 
of demands for the purpose of bargaining the deal, one should be 
able to make out which ones of their demands are achievable in the 
given regional and international scenarios. There is no political 
wisdom in holding on to demands that are not achievable.  For the 
sake of rhetoric, the Naga militants can say that they will continue 
to fight for political independence for another century or so, but 
they have to realise the truth that right to self-determination does 
not necessarily mean political independence. There can be many 
other ways open for the communities to exercise this right. It 
would be suicidal for any community to opt for secession, when it 
does not have the minimal material and human resources to 
sustain independence. The Nagas ought also to realize that their 
demand for integration of all Naga inhabited areas under one 
administrative unit could become a reality only with the consent of 
other communities in the region, which is a difficult to visualise in 
the near future. Unilaterally the Indian government cannot enter 
into any agreement with Naga militants on this issue, ignoring the 
opinions and sentiments of other communities and states. Rather 
than using coercive tactics to make other communities accept their 
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demand, it is better for the Nagas to opt for peaceful persuasive 
means to win over its neighbours.  
The Naga intellectuals and civil groups have to play their 
part in building rapport with their counterparts in other states. In 
view of the fact that emotions are involved in the issue, the process 
may take a long time and the Nagas may need to show maturity 
and patience. Only in an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
confidence, can the communities understand one another’s points 
of view and explore solutions acceptable to all the parties in 
conflict. Scholars like B.K. Roy Burman and Sanjib Baruah have 
made some suggestions regarding possible alternatives for 
resolution of the problem of Naga integration.41 Granting 
autonomous state status to the Naga inhabited regions within the 
respective states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh and 
the cultural integration of Nagaland with these autonomous states 
could be one of the options that could be explored. It would have 
been easier for the Nagas to seek realistic answers to their 
predicaments had the Naga society been united under one 
leadership. Unfortunately the division of the Naga society along 
tribal and ideological lines restricts the possibilities of coming out 
with viable alternatives. Being aware of the negative effects of 
inter-tribal and inter-group rivalries, the Naga Hoho and the 
Baptist Church have rightly appealed to all Naga groups for 
reconciliation of their differences by forgiving their enemies and 
forgetting their bitter past. All the Naga militant groups should 
pay heed to the appeals of the Naga civil society groups for unity 
and reconciliation among the Nagas. As long as the Nagas are 
divided, they cannot negotiate a durable peace and settlement with 
the Indian state.  
The Indian government, on its part, should take up greater 
responsibility to ensure that peace talks yield positive results. For 
the talks to succeed, the Indian government should give up its 
traditional policy of looking at Naga resistance from a security 
angle.  No amount of money pumped into Nagaland could put an 
end to Naga insurgency, as the Naga struggle is not aiming at 
economic development. The Nagas continued their struggle for 
five decades basically for political recognition of Nagas as a 
distinct nation.42 As such Naga resistance movement is basically a 
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struggle of an emerging nationality for a political identity of its 
own. Being basically a political problem, the government of India 
should realize that the Naga problem cannot be resolved by 
military or monitory strategies.  It should therefore be clear to the 
Indian leaders that the Naga problem could be resolved only 
through political means. While engaging the Naga militants in 
political dialogue, the Indian leaders should treat them as political 
representatives of the Nagas, not as terrorists or misguided 
citizens. India and the Indians must recognize in letter and spirit 
the unique history of the Nagas and respect their right to self-
determination. The Indian government should officially admit that 
the repressive strategies that it adopted to break the Naga 
resistance movement have led to large-scale violation of human 
rights and alienated the Nagas from India. Apart from 
acknowledging it, the Indian government should openly apologize 
for its misdeeds and convince the Naga people that irrespective of 
whether the talks succeed or not, it would not again resort to 
inhuman means in future that would cause hardships to the Naga 
civilians. While India has the right to protect its national interests, 
it should become pragmatic enough to realize that insisting on 
finding solutions within the framework of the Indian Constitution 
may not always be in the interests of India. The experience of 
Canada shows that the Canadian interests are best served by 
according official recognition to the aboriginal Indians as the First 
Nations and negotiating treaties with them to determine what kind 
of relations they would like to have with the Federal and Provincial 
governments. Given the geo-political realities, the Nagas have to 
depend on India in one or the other matter. The Nagas need better 
relations with India as much as India needs with the Nagas. Hence 
there is no need for India to worry that the Nagas’ demand for self-
determination would go against its national interests. The symbolic 
recognition of the Nagas as a nation and entering into a treaty with 
NSCN (IM) leadership, recognizing them as representatives of the 
Naga nation, helps India to advance its interests better. The peace 
negotiation is indeed a test for Indian leadership to prove its tact, 
diplomacy and creativity. Only when the Indian government and 
the NSCN (IM) leadership succeed in making a fair deal acceptable 
to all sections of the Nagas and also to other indigenous 
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communities in the region, one could hope for an enduring peace 
and development in the region.   
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